UKRAINE, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA: THE EUROPEAN UNION ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS AND NATO

AN ANALYTICAL REPORT
UKRAINE, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA:
THE EUROPEAN UNION ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS AND NATO

An analytical report
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On September 4–5, 2014, NATO leaders met in Wales for a summit. Held every other year, NATO summits are an opportunity to review the alliance’s strategic goals, develop new policies and adopt new members. The Welsh city of Newport received more than 150 heads of state, ministers and other senior government officials, as well as 2,000 journalists. In a letter to other NATO leaders on the eve of the summit, British Prime Minister David Cameron called for the alliance to review its long-term relationship with Russia.¹

The policy documents published ahead of the summit suggest the “review” will involve planning concrete political and military measures against Russia.

In fact, measures are already being taken. The Baltic Air Policing force in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania² has been strengthened, while additional fighter jets and NATO ground forces have been redeployed to bases in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Estonia.³ NATO is also considering permanent deployment of the NATO Response Force in East European countries, with a command center in Szczecin, Poland,⁴ according to a statement made by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on August 27, 2014.

Finnish Defense Minister Carl Haglund, in turn, said Finland — which is not a NATO member — would also allow the deployment of the NATO Response Force on its territory. Sweden, another non-member, is ready to follow suit.⁵ In addition, seven NATO countries — Britain, Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway and the Netherlands — will assemble a response task force of their own. All of these changes have been publicly announced.

The purpose of this study is to cast light on some of the less publicized actions undertaken to expand NATO’s influence in countries that were Russian allies not long ago — Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The focus of the study is twofold. **First, it describes NATO’s stealth expansion — drawing countries into military and political cooperation with the alliance through the European Union, which signed Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova on June 27, 2014.**


The agreements have been portrayed as purely economic deals. Yet, Title II of the Association Agreement mentions “convergence in the field of foreign and security policy”²⁶. In particular, the agreement binds the signatory to join the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, which is closely linked to NATO.

The Common Security and Defence Policy is the key component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, which is based on the three D’s that encapsulate Washington’s expectations: no duplication of what can be done effectively under NATO, no decoupling of the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members such as Turkey. The Common Security and Defence Policy provides a framework for strategic cooperation between EU and NATO military structures and links the North American and European parts of NATO.

Second, this study assesses the degree to which NATO has already built up capacity and forces in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

We analyze the three countries’ defense doctrines, existing NATO infrastructure on their territories, the scale and specific features of combat and command training, the number and nature of military exercises, adoption of NATO standards, participation in US and NATO operations, and the institutional mechanisms for spreading NATO propaganda. We also look closely at the records of these countries’ current military commanders. Our conclusion is that the three countries’ “partnerships” with NATO are not much different from membership in terms of NATO capacity and influence in these countries.

Moreover, official NATO membership for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova is actually less desirable for NATO and the US than the NATO “partnership” and EU “association” formats. NATO can continue to adhere to its rule of not admitting member states with unresolved borders, allowing the alliance to maintain the fiction of offering a “concession” to Russia and to avoid expanding the “collective defense” obligation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which requires all NATO members to come to the aid of any member that has been attacked.

The depth and pace of NATO integration varies only slightly among Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and all three countries are working with NATO to some degree in the following strategic areas:

- NATO involvement in the combat and command-and-staff training of national armed forces.
- Participation in NATO military exercises, either in their own territories or in other NATO countries.
- Identifying and supporting promising officers, providing training at leading military institutes in NATO countries.
- Financing, construction and repair of any infrastructure that might further NATO interests.
- Imposing NATO standards with regard to weapons and equipment, tactics and operations, and defense doctrines under the guise of increasing interoperability.

²⁶ Full name of Title II of the EU Association Agreement: Political Dialogue and Reform, Political Association, Cooperation and Convergence in the Field of Foreign and Security Policy.
• Exposing national forces to on-the-ground experience in NATO’s foreign operations (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan), as well as UN peacekeeping missions.

**The planned “review” of NATO policy toward Russia has to be considered in the context of evolving US strategy for Russia.** The US government appears to have recalibrated its strategy in 2012 following Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency, and Russia is now discussed in the US foreign policy establishment using the language of containment — the doctrine formulated by George Kennan in 1947, which guided US foreign policy for most of the Cold War.7

As part of “Containment 2.0,” Russia has been officially designated as a strategic opponent of the West. On June 6, 2014, the think tank Chatham House released a paper called *Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance*, which said that “there can be no return to a ‘strategic partnership’ between NATO and Russia.”8 On June 13, Alexander Vershbow, a prominent US diplomat and Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, reiterated that idea in a commencement speech at the NATO Defense College in Rome, where he said NATO no longer regarded Russia as a partner. It is also reflected in the US Congress’ Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 20149 and the defense report *Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part Two — NATO*10 released by the UK House of Commons Defence Committee on July 31, 2014.

A separate series of measures has been prepared for Ukraine. Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in an interview with The Guardian on August 27 that NATO would establish four “trust funds” to finance Ukraine’s military logistics, command and control structures, and cyber defenses, and to pay the armed forces' pensions.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian government, seeking NATO’s assistance in the development of its national military infrastructure, approved a “catalogue” of potential Ukrainian contributions to NATO’s international peacekeeping operations and exercises — a list of military airfields, sea and river ports and railway stations capable of receiving foreign “peacekeeping” forces arriving to Ukraine for exercises.

This study provides the factual information needed for a deeper understanding of the process and methods of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova’s integration with NATO and EU military-political structures. With the help of the interactive map of NATO’s expansion available on the website of the Rossiya Segodnya Center for International Journalism and Research, we chart NATO’s steady eastward expansion since 1990, despite US Secretary of State James Baker’s promise to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction one inch to the East”.

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EU AND NATO
MILITARY-POLITICAL
STRUCTURES
AND ARMED FORCES
# Dangerous neighbors: The relationship between EU and NATO military structures and capabilities

The EU commands combat-ready units that are closely connected with NATO forces. Western countries can use EU capabilities to conduct military operations where NATO involvement is impractical for political reasons. But leaders of the two organizations' member-countries sit on the executive bodies of both the EU and NATO.

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## COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY, CSDP

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<th>EU External Action Service, EEAS</th>
<th>NATO</th>
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<td>EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
<td>NATO Military Committee</td>
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<th>EU Military Committee</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU Political and Security Committee, PSC</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
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<td>EU Intelligence Analysis Center, INTCCEN</td>
<td>500 military and civilian personnel</td>
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<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>Routine: 24/7</td>
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<td>Political intelligence</td>
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<td>EU Satellite Center</td>
<td>NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>Torrejon de Ardoz, Spain</td>
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<td>Satellite intelligence</td>
<td>NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)</td>
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<td>Mons, Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<th>EU Military Staff</th>
<th>EUMS representation</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU Battlegroups (EUBG)</td>
<td>NATO Response Force (NRF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are 18 EUBGs on standby, including two high readiness groups</td>
<td>Rotation every 6-12 months (starting 2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Corps (Eurocorps)</td>
<td>Some EU members</td>
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<td>Some EU members</td>
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<tr>
<th>Visegrad Battlegroup</th>
<th>Franco-German Brigade</th>
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<tr>
<td>To comprise Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian troops</td>
<td>Müllheim, Germany</td>
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<td>On standby: from 2016</td>
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<td>Provisional strength: 3,250 (as of 2012)</td>
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### Eurocorps

Eurocorps is the standby element of the NATO Response Force 7

### Visegrad Battlegroup

The Visegrad Battlegroup will train under the NRF

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The European Union’s current military structures developed as a result of NATO reforms carried out in the early 1990s. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there was a need to redistribute military, financial and other resources among European and North American alliance members in a way that made more sense.

During the NATO summit in Oslo in 1992, NATO foreign ministers agreed to strengthen the Western European Union as NATO’s “European column” by giving the union’s member-countries access to NATO military capabilities and resources for European operations. In 1994, NATO drafted a concept for the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), which includes the creation of a “separable but not separate” staff for EU-sponsored military operations.

In 1996, NATO foreign ministers developed the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) at their meeting in Berlin. The ESDI made it possible to revise the system governing the involvement of individual members or groups of member-countries in NATO military operations. As a result, the United States and Canada could leave military solutions to global problems to European member-countries. The ministers also discussed the idea of a Berlin
Plus Agreement and decided that NATO assets and capabilities could be made available for WEU-led operations.

The development of NATO-based European military capabilities was boosted by cooperation between Britain and France. During a summit in Saint-Malo, France, in 1998, the sides agreed to create what came to be known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which the European Council approved at its meeting in Cologne in 1999. The sides decided to make available to the EU the assets and capabilities necessary to meet its obligations in the ESDP framework. In other words, they supported the NATO initiative to create separate EU military structures with reliance on NATO resources.

Relations between the military-political structures of NATO and the EU were formalized in 2001. Their chief officials exchanged official letters on the format of their cooperation, and ambassadors and permanent representatives of both organizations’ member-countries held their first meeting. At the NATO summit in Prague in 2002, NATO member-countries decided that military resources and other assistance should be provided to the EU for operations in which NATO is not officially involved. In 2004, the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) dispatched a permanent group of liaison officers to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which opened a mission at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), one of NATO's two strategic military headquarters.

In 2008, the Treaty of Lisbon transformed the ESDP into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and created the European External Action Service (EEAS), to be led by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The EEAS includes the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the EU's main military advisory body, consisting of the chiefs of staff of EU member-countries, i.e. nearly all NATO countries. The EUMC provides the Council of Europe with advice and recommendations on military policy. The EEAS also controls two civilian intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Analysis Centre of the European Union (INTCEN), which provides assessments of political intelligence from member-states’ intelligence services, and the EU Satellite Center.

The European Union Military Staff is headquartered in Brussels and reports directly to the EU Military Committee. One of the main divisions of the EUMS, the Intelligence Directorate (military intelligence), works jointly with the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, which is part of the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). The current commander of the EUMS Intelligence Directorate is Commodore Georgij Alafuzoff (Finland), the descendant of a White Russian émigré. Commenting on the protests in Moscow in 2012, Alafuzoff told Finnish media that Putin's end was near and that Russia would soon be free.

The EUMS commands several military units of European countries, but the only high readiness formation is the European Corps (Eurocorps). Eurocorps' core force is the Franco-German Brigade headquartered in Müllheim, Germany. In wartime and during operations in which troops are deployed outside
the EU, the Eurocorps can be reinforced with the 10th Armored Division of the Bundeswehr (Germany), the 1st Medium Brigade of the Belgian Army, Spain’s 1st Mechanized Division (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) and a reconnaissance company from Luxembourg.

From July 2006 to January 2007, HQ Eurocorps was the land component stand-by element of the NATO Response Force 7. Its units also contributed to the police mission of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The European Union Military Staff also commands the EU Force (EUFOR), a rapid reaction force of military and police units for peacekeeping purposes. In practice, EU military forces in Africa are used to restore order in former European colonies and can be therefore described as occupying forces.

Other military structures directly reporting to the Council of Europe are EU Battlegroups (EUBG). The idea of creating these rapid response groups was first announced at a Franco-British summit in Le Touquet on February 4, 2003. To meet the requirements of the CSDP, they proposed creating rapid response capabilities, “including initial deployment of land, sea and air forces within 5–10 days”.

In accordance with the EU Battlegroup Concept,\textsuperscript{11} which was released by the UK, France and Germany on March 22, 2004, a battle group (BG) is the smallest force package capable of stand-alone operations that can be deployed and sustained in a theatre of operation outside the EU. The core element of a naval battle group is an air-capable group (an air carrier with auxiliary vessels), while a land-based battle group is a battalion-size formation with up to 1,500 troops reinforced with combat support elements.

The EU battle groups rotate out every 6–12 months. They can be formed by individual countries with considerable military capabilities or by groups of countries that are usually bound by a common language or culture.

For example, the Visegrad Battlegroup, which is to be placed on standby in the first half of 2016, will include not only Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Polish troops (the nations of the Visegrad Group), but also military personnel from Ukraine. According to media reports, the Visegrad Battlegroup will train under the supervision and control of the NATO Response Force.

Clearly, the military-political structures and forces of the EU and NATO are deeply interconnected and closely coordinate their operations. The EU Military Committee consists of the chiefs of staff of member-countries, who are also members of NATO’s International Military Staff and other NATO command and staff divisions. Wrapping up discussions at a meeting of the EUMS and IMS representatives on January 27, 2014, EUMS Director General Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (Austria) said: “Both organisations have one ‘reservoir’ of capabilities that belong to Allies and Member States alike, and synergising capability development and standardisation is key to both organisations”\textsuperscript{12}.


UKRAINE: A “DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP” WITH THE EU AS A SUBMISSION MECHANISM
NATO capabilities, forces and facilities in Ukraine

The ongoing military conflict in Ukraine reveals the extent to which the country, in its 20 years of independence, has become an anti-Russian foothold on Russia's western border. Ukraine's leadership has prepared an extensive catalogue of military infrastructure for use by NATO, and is asking Washington and Brussels for NATO membership and advanced weaponry.

### Departments and organizations assisting Ukraine in its integration with NATO

- EU Department at the Ukrainian MFA
- US Department at the Ukrainian MFA
- International Security Department
- Ukraine's mission in NATO
- NATO Information and Documentation Center
- NATO Communications Center in Ukraine
- NATO-Ukraine Civic League
- Atlantic Council (Rada) of Ukraine
- Euro-Atlantic integration centers in the regions
- National Security Expert Council
- International Center for Advanced Studies
- National Institute of Strategic Studies
- New Ukraine Institute for Strategic Studies
- Center for Civil Society Issues
- Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Studies
- National Convention on the EU in Ukraine
- Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
- Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association
- National Endowment for Democracy (US)
- USAID
- National Democratic Institute (US)
- International Republican Institute (US)
- EU Police Mission to Ukraine
- Belgian Embassy in Ukraine
- Institute for Public Affairs (IVO, Bratislava)
- Slovak Aid
- Euro-Atlantic Integration Center at the Shevchenko Lugansk National University
- Research and Training Center for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine in Nikolayev
- Lvov Center on Euro-Atlantic Integration

### Information centers and Euro-Atlantic integration centers operate throughout Ukraine

IN 2012, THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT APPROVED THE CATALOGUE OF UKRAINE'S CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES. One of the first decisions made by the current Kiev authorities after taking power in 2014 was to increase the number of joint military exercises with NATO from three in 2013 to eight in 2014. Exercises with Russia and CIS countries have been cancelled.

- Railway stations
- Airports (air fields)
- Seaports
- Ukrainian Ground Forces Command's operation support and training facilities
- Ukrainian Air Force Command's operation support and training facilities
NATO capabilities, forces and facilities in Ukraine

THE 2012 CATALOGUE INCLUDED CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL, WHICH REUNITED WITH RUSSIA IN 2014
NATO must remove them from its plans
Any consideration of the efforts to draw Ukraine into NATO’s orbit should begin with the key policy documents that form the basis of Ukraine’s “Euro-Atlantic integration”. There is already a comprehensive legal and political framework in place, which makes clear Kiev’s aspirations to become, if not a full member, then at least a close partner of the alliance.

The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine is the first official document announcing Ukraine’s intention to draw closer to NATO. It is an important political declaration, as it defines in no uncertain terms the positions of the parties and the priorities guiding their cooperation. Thus, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Charter state:

“3. Ukraine reaffirms its determination to carry forward its defence reforms, to strengthen democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, and to increase their interoperability with the forces of NATO and Partner countries. NATO reaffirms its support for Ukraine’s efforts in these areas”.

“4. Ukraine welcomes NATO’s continuing and active adaptation to meet the changing circumstances of Euro-Atlantic security, and its role, in cooperation with other international organisations such as the OSCE, the European Union,
EU structures cooperate with NATO under the Common Security and Defence Policy, as mentioned above.

The Council of Europe and the Western European Union in promoting Euro-Atlantic security and fostering a general climate of trust and confidence in Europe. The Charter also establishes the degree of NATO involvement in strategically important areas, such as:

- civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness;
- civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, and Ukrainian defence reform;
- defence planning, budgeting, policy, strategy and national security concepts;
- defence conversion;
- NATO-Ukraine military cooperation and interoperability;
- economic aspects of security;
- science and technology issues;
- environmental security issues, including nuclear safety;
- aerospace research and development, through AGARD (Advisory Group For Aerospace Research & Development. — Ed.);
- civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control.

The Charter, signed by President Leonid Kuchma in 1997, cemented Ukraine’s “Euro-Atlantic aspirations” for decades to come.

Poland has played an integral role in the efforts to draw Ukraine into NATO. For example, paragraph 8 of the Charter states that Ukraine and NATO will perform “military training, including the PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory and NATO support for the Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion”.

The “special partnership” that started with the signing of the Charter later evolved into the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, adopted on November 22, 2002, amid the war in Afghanistan and in the run-up to US aggression against Iraq.

Section I(B) of this document goes beyond mere declarations, stating as Ukraine’s foreign and security policy principle its “full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures,” this being Ukraine’s “foreign policy priority and strategic goal”. To this end, Ukraine agreed in the plan to meet its political commitments, such as bringing the army and security forces in line with the “Euro-Atlantic policy of the country”. Other commitments are clearly spelled out in the plan. There is no ambiguity. By signing the plan, Ukraine pledged to:

- open up the national economy “in conformity with World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) standards,” i.e. hand it over to foreign managers;
- reorganize the Ukrainian armed forces into a well-trained, well-equipped armed force “able to contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the auspices of international organisations;”
- “adopt NATO standards and practices” to support Ukraine’s notorious Euro-Atlantic integration and to improve the interoperability of the Ukrainian armed forces and NATO forces by participating in the “NATO-led crisis response operations;”
- increase its contribution to NATO-led “peacekeeping operations” in the Balkans and Afghanistan (2002);
• maintain the readiness of Rapid Reaction Force units for participation in joint NATO–Ukraine operations, and train these units to meet NATO standards;
• achieve a required level of compatibility for the actual and future armaments and military equipment and doctrine of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with NATO;
• and, finally, develop interoperability between Ukraine and NATO communication and information systems, i.e., channels for transmitting and sharing military and political information.

To prove its commitment to Euro–Atlantic integration, Ukraine agreed to transfer classified military information to NATO intelligence divisions. The plan also provided for upgrading state telecommunication and information systems where NATO classified information may pass, in accordance with NATO requirements and standards. Under the pretext of “information security,” the Ukrainian military were also invited to “exchange classified information with NATO on military planning and reform”\(^\text{20}\).

Thus, in the late 1990s — early 2000s, the foundation was laid to draw Ukraine into NATO’s orbit. It should be noted that the documents signed by Ukraine are extremely wide-ranging: NATO gained access to all levels of Ukraine’s military-political system, from the defense industry to classified information on defense planning.

Ukraine–NATO relations received an additional boost from the 2004 Orange Revolution. After taking power in a coup, Viktor Yushchenko’s pro-Western government continued Leonid Kuchma’s policy of drawing closer to NATO, accelerating and expanding the scope of “Euro–Atlantic integration”.

On March 13, 2006, President Viktor Yushchenko signed the executive order On the National System of Coordination of Cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to prepare Ukraine to join the alliance. National coordinators assigned to various government agencies in Ukraine were charged with performing “tasks in areas related to NATO cooperation, including preparing the country to join NATO”\(^\text{21}\).

The executive order applied to the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Security Council, the Ukrainian Security Service, the Border Guard, the Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Economy and other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Education, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and others.

Under Yushchenko, Ukraine did its utmost at the political and practical level to secure a Membership Action Plan — the ticket into NATO.

However, his government had to contend with legitimate doubts in European capitals as to whether the alliance should assume the burden of defending Ukraine and Georgia. On April 2, 2008, the former head of the NATO Military Committee — the alliance’s highest military authority — General Harald Kujat of Germany said in an interview with Deutsche Welle: “The Alliance should expand when it is in its own interests and the interests of the states seeking

\(^{20}\) Ibid., Section III, para. 3.

as the North Atlantic Council, led by Germany and France, voted down the United States initiative to put Ukraine and Georgia on a path to NATO membership during the Bucharest summit\textsuperscript{23}. This decision was vindicated by subsequent Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia and the August 2008 war, in which Ukraine supplied Buk-M1 air defense systems and other heavy weapons to Mikhail Saakashvili’s regime.

Viktor Yanukovych, elected president of Ukraine in the winter of 2010, changed course and put his “unaligned agenda” at the center of his policy approach, reflecting the wishes of the Russian-speaking population of southeastern Ukraine and all reasonable members of Ukrainian society.

But, as we will see in the next chapter, practical military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO never stopped for a minute, even under the new “pro-Russian” president.

At the political level, efforts to draw Ukraine into NATO have slowed significantly. Yanukovych signed Executive Order 495/2010 on April 2, 2010, closing the National center for the Euro–Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. Executive Order 496/2010 abolished the Interdepartmental commission on Preparing Ukraine to Join NATO, effectively rescinding his predecessor's executive order on the National system for Coordinating Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.

Finally, on July 2, 2010, the law \textit{On the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy} passed the Verkhovna Rada with 259 votes. The law defines the core principle of Ukraine’s foreign policy as staying out of military-political unions\textsuperscript{24}.

To compensate for this turn away from NATO, the Ukrainian leadership pursued military-political integration with the European Union. Kiev and Brussels finalized the text of the \textit{EU–Ukraine Association Agreement} on December 19, 2011\textsuperscript{25}, while Viktor Yanukovych was still president. On March 30, 2012, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported that the parties had initialed the negotiated text\textsuperscript{26} and that it was prepared for ratification by parliament and the president’s signature.

Contrary to popular belief, the agreement is more than just a free trade zone or a choice between the EU and the Eurasian Union.

After imposing the Association Agreement on Kiev, the West skirted the Bucharest NATO summit’s decision and found an indirect way to draw Ukraine into the alliance’s orbit. \textit{Title II} of the \textit{Association Agreement} is important for understanding this “indirect strategy”.

This section, written in broad diplomatic language, does not name any NATO or EU military structures directly. However, one of the goals of the “political dialogue” aimed at ensnaring Ukraine in the West’s geopolitical sphere is “to develop dialogue and to deepen cooperation between the Parties in the field of security and defence”\textsuperscript{27}. This is not an agreement about free trade or customs duties. Its principal aim is to integrate Ukraine into NATO’s military-political structure, which is indirectly referenced in Article 5 (3b): Brussels and Kiev will
take “full and timely advantage of all diplomatic and military channels between the Parties, including appropriate contacts in third countries and within the United Nations, the OSCE and other international fora”.

For “third country” read “United States,” while “international forums” apparently include the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), established in 1997.

No less important is the fact that the agreement makes the **Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)** — the foundation of NATO–EU strategic cooperation — the primary mechanism for EU–Ukraine cooperation.

The way Yanukovych backed out of signing the Association Agreement in late 2013 made for awkward politics, and his attempt to have his cake and eat it too resulted in an armed coup. President Yanukovych’s decision to step down and flee Ukraine cleared the way for Ukraine’s full-scale integration in NATO.

Following Crimea’s unification with Russia and the outbreak of the conflict in southeastern Ukraine, activity between Ukraine and the West began to pick up pace. It is now absolutely clear that the leadership of the United States and NATO have used the Ukrainian crisis to build up its military infrastructure on the Russian border and draw Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova into NATO’s orbit in one capacity or another.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) inherited a considerable part of the weaponry and military equipment deployed in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as military colleges located on its territory. As a result, Ukraine was still able to train officers of all levels despite the deplorable state of its army and failure to develop its military capability over the last 20 years. Notwithstanding repeated changes in the country’s leadership and political instability, the army’s infrastructure and training methods were still largely rooted in the Soviet past.

This feature of the Ukrainian military shaped the mindset of the average officer trained in the post-Soviet period. Unlike Georgia, which has fully outsourced military training to the United States, Ukraine preserved traditions of military and theoretical training of career officers that had been developed over the preceding decades.

It goes without saying that those pushing Ukraine towards a Euro-Atlantic future were uncomfortable with this state of affairs. It is for this reason that the core documents of Ukraine-NATO cooperation attach special importance to military education and training reform.
Another reason why NATO has sought to infiltrate UAF training is the need to boost the interoperability of Ukraine’s most effective units with NATO forces. In practice, interoperability means that UAF units will follow the NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) in terms of equipment, tactics, communication systems, and staff work. Senior officers of so-called interoperable units take English language courses, study NATO military terminology and combat doctrines, and, most importantly, follow these principles in their day-to-day operations.

A focus of interoperability is the quality and nature of combat training, which makes sense for NATO: the armies within the alliance must be confident that the subordinate Ukrainian forces are an effective fighting force ready for redeployment in conflict zones. NATO relies on two key methods to “tame” the Ukrainian army: holding joint military exercises and improving the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military during NATO operations abroad.

For Ukraine’s military and political leaders, such exercises and participation in NATO wars are part of combat training. For example, according to the Armed Forces White Paper published by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry in 2009, one of the objectives of the Ground Forces is “phase-based re-equipment of the troops, starting with the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, with new NATO-compatible equipment”. The same White Paper designates “the development of the Armed Forces’ capabilities in UN, EU, and NATO-led operations” as the main area of cooperation between the UAF and the Pentagon in 2013.

Furthermore, NATO experts evaluate the UAF’s combat readiness after every joint exercise. In 2013, NATO gave high marks to the Kostiantyn Olshansky landing ship and the Hetman Sahaydachny frigate of the Ukrainian Navy. In 2009, the Ternopil anti-submarine corvette, a paratroops battalion, an engineer battalion and an anti-sabotage group of the Ukrainian Navy were recognized as “partially interoperable”.

Ukraine uses peacekeeping operations and training as cover for enhancing the army’s interoperability with NATO. However, a diligent observer won’t fail to notice that the peacekeeping operations, for which the Ukrainian army is purportedly preparing, have nothing in common with what the blue helmets are doing in troubled regions around the world. In fact, NATO uses peacekeeping as a pretext to create its infrastructure and gain a foothold on the Ukrainian territory.

The International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC) in the village of Starichi near Lvov has become one of the key elements of this infrastructure.

The IPSC has a 28 x 15 kilometer training area, which can be used to hold large-scale exercises involving air forces, artillery, paratroopers, ground troops, and armor. According to official web resources of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the IPSC includes training facilities for gunners, divers, paratroopers, tank crews and engineers, as well as everything required for small arms practice and tactical, specialized troops and even psychological training.

The fact that the IPSC hosts the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is further proof of its importance for NATO in Ukraine. According to official statements, PfP’s educational center trains military staff of all levels — from enlisted
men and NCO’s to brigade-battalion multinational staff officers — to later participate in NATO operations. The center also offers training in English-language military terminology, and is involved in drafting documents on the incorporation of NATO standards in UAF combat training programs. It is for these reasons that IPSC hosts Rapid Trident, the largest annual Ukraine-US military exercise.

The IPSC can accommodate up to 1,790 Ukrainian and NATO servicemen in three barracks — Tsentralnaya, Gvardeyskaya and Inzhenernaya — and is called NATO’s closest neighbor, since it is only 10–15 kilometers away from the border with Poland. It has a ramified road network and three airfields — Sknyliv, Stryy, and Cheryany — which can receive foreign participants in military exercises and equipment.

On top of promoting military integration, NATO has established information offices in Ukraine and has actively encouraged NGOs to convince Ukrainians, and youth in particular, that the country’s future lies with NATO. The following organizations have been pushing NATO membership for Ukraine at the national level:

The **NATO Information and Documentation Center** was established by the US in Ukraine in 1997. Michel Duray from the NATO HQ was appointed as director in 2002. It is now headed by Natalia Nemyliwska, who served in the Ontario government, Canada, before coming to Ukraine.

The **NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine** is headed by Marcin Koziel, a Polish career officer.

**Regional Euro–Atlantic Integration Centers and NATO information offices** are now being opened across the country. These projects were initiated, among others, by Oleg Soskin, chairman of the Ukraine-NATO Civic League Coordination Council.

Even a partial list illustrates the geographical reach of these organizations involved in promoting NATO’s agenda.

- **The Dnipropetrovsk Region** has a Euro–Atlantic Integration Center, which was “established to raise public awareness among Dnipropetrovsk residents of the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its history, operations, strategies, and Ukraine’s Euro–Atlantic integration”. The center was launched in Dnipropetrovsk on February 28, 2007.
- **The Donetsk Region** hosted the NATO Autumn Academy on October 24–26, 2006, at the Donetsk National University to explore the topic “NATO, Europe and Regional Security in a Globalized World”. Donetsk hosted another NATO Autumn Academy from November 30 to December 2, 2010.
- **The Zhitomir Region** is home to a Euro–Atlantic Integration Center established within the Ivan Franko Zhitomir State University in April 2008. It is supported by the Norwegian embassy and Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry.
- **The Kirovograd Region** has a Center for Euro–Atlantic and European Integration. It was established with the support of Oleg Soskin within the Sukhomlinsky Postgraduate State Teacher Training Institute. Its sponsors are the regional office of the Civil Service Department and the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine.
• The Lugansk Region: The annual NATO Autumn Academy was held in the city of Lugansk on October 18–19, 2007, at the Taras Shevchenko Teacher Training Institute, and focused on the theme “Myth and Reality in NATO-Ukraine Relations”. The event was sponsored and organized by the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine.

• The Odessa Region: The Odessa Scientific-Informational Centre for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation opened on December 18, 2008. It was established by Oleg Soskin’s Institute of Societal Transformation within the Ushinsky South Ukrainian State Teacher Training Institute with the support of the Lithuanian embassy and Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry.

Given the extent to which the idea of Ukraine’s membership in the alliance of “peaceful democracies” penetrated the minds of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, it is unsurprising that the country now actively participates in NATO wars across the world.

The fact that Ukrainian soldiers and officers were recently involved in overseas combat operations is little known to the Russian public. But this is the logical result of the agreements Ukraine signed with NATO, its commitment to interoperability and the numerous exercises held at the Yavoriv PfP Training Center and abroad.

Iraq, one of the most bloody and destructive wars in recent history, warrants special attention in this respect. Ukrainian troops were in Iraq from the very start of this war of aggression that the anti-Iraq coalition launched against the Saddam regime, making it all the way from Kuwait to Erbil province in central Iraq.

It was Yevgeny Marchuk, Chairman of the National Security and Defense Council and a close ally of then-President Leonid Kuchma, who was behind the idea to send Ukrainian troops to Iraq \(^\text{30}\). This was a political decision designed to distract the US from the fact that Ukraine had sold a Kolchuga electronic support systems to Iraq, as well as to improve its somewhat troubled relationship with Washington.

In December 2002, as the coalition forces were already being redeployed to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the UAF’s Integrated Rapid Reaction Force started to form a radiation, chemical and biological defense battalion within its 704th Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Regiment in Sambor, Lvov Region.

The battalion was manned with enlistees drawn from across Ukraine. Many of them had already participated in peacekeeping missions. When the unit was established, it included 73 recipients of the UN Medal “In the Service of Peace,” 42 recipients of the NATO Medal “In Service of Peace and Freedom,” and 2 recipients of the Soviet medal “Internationalist Warrior” for their role in the Afghan war. Lt. Col. Yuri Onishchuk, deputy commander for equipment of the 704th Regiment, was appointed as commander of the battalion, and Lt. Col. Vasily Kitsula became his chief of staff.

On March 18, 2003, the Ukrainian president signed Executive Order No. 227 to send the 19th Separate Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Battalion, 704th Regiment, Western Operational Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, or Military Unit A2174, to Kuwait.

Transit of the 19th Battalion to Kuwait started on March 22 and ran through April 6, 2003, with soldiers and equipment travelling from Snilow airport in Lvov to Kuwait on board Il–76MD airplanes of Ukraine's Defense Ministry. It took 53 flights to transport all 450 people and equipment.

The Ukrainian battalion was headquartered at Camp Arifjan 180 kilometers from Kuwait's western border, 125 kilometers from its northern border with Iraq, and 50 kilometers from Kuwait's capital. Surrounded by desert, the camp was just 8 kilometers away from the Persian Gulf.

The battalion's combat employment was overseen by the United States Naval Forces Central Command. Ukrainian officials asserted that the battalion, headquartered in Kuwait, was on a humanitarian mission and would not enter Iraq. But that was not the case. Upon its arrival in Kuwait, the battalion was informed that once US troops completed the active phase of the offensive, they would be “invited” to Iraq, to guard facilities and deliver cargoes.

Despite the fact that coalition forces failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, sending the chemical defense battalion back to Ukraine was out of the question, as Washington and Kiev were already discussing Ukraine's military presence in Iraq by that point.

At the same time, given the situation on the ground in Iraq, there was no need for a chemical battalion within the 5th Separate Mechanized Brigade, which was being formed at the time. For this reason, as the 5th Brigade was redeployed to Kuwait on July 25–31, 2003, the 19th Battalion became the 19th Separate Special Battalion.

On August 1, 2003, this battalion moved from Camp Arifjan to Camp Coyote 40 kilometers from the Iraqi border, where it waited for the arrival of the 5th Brigade's main forces in Iraq.

And on August 11, at 6:47 am, Kiev time, the 19th Battalion crossed from Kuwait into Iraq and headed toward the city of Al-Kut in the Wasit Province, where it was to be stationed. This was how Ukraine joined NATO's war in Iraq, its first “peacekeeping” experience as an independent state.

At the same time, the first major unit of the Ukrainian army, the 5th Separate Mechanized Brigade, was forming for redeployment to Iraq. The Ukrainian president and government issued the necessary orders and resolutions in June 2003, but the preparations had started a month earlier, which proves how hasty the formation of this brigade was.

Unlike regular mechanized brigades, the 5th Brigade lacked tanks, artillery and a number of other elements, though it did include sixty BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (APCs), nine BTR-60 APCs (R-145BM command and staff vehicles), eleven BRDM–2 armored reconnaissance vehicles, and 217 different trucks for a total of 1,800 personnel.

On July 16, 2003, the convoy started moving towards Oktyabrsky Port near the city of Nikolayev. By July 18, all equipment and containers had reached the port, and the next day were loaded on a Turkish ferry, the Safiyet Bey, which left for the Persian Gulf on July 21.
Two weeks later, on August 6–9, 2003, aircraft began departing from the Borispol and Nikolayev airports every several hours, transporting Ukrainian personnel to a US base in Kuwait, with the Turkish ferry awaiting unloading in the port of Kuwait City.

At dawn on August 11, 2003, the first convoy of the Ukrainian contingent crossed into Iraq. After a 500 kilometer journey, the first brigade units reached the Al-Kut airfield on the banks of the Tigris River. The Ukrainian brigade replaced a 1,200-strong battalion of the 30th Marine Division of the United States, which had “mopped up” the city ahead of the Ukrainians’ arrival.

The 5th Separate Mechanized Brigade joined the Multinational Division Central-South under US and later Polish command. Among the commanders of the brigade was Chief of Staff Colonel Viktor Muzhenko, who would later become Chief of the General Staff of the UAF and actual head of the so-called counter-terrorism operation in the south-east of Ukraine in 2014.

The Multinational Division’s command ordered the brigade to carry out patrols, operate checkpoints, protect a 120-kilometer-long section of the Iraqi border with Iran, and undertake mop-up operations, which are standard tasks for an occupying force.

The Ukrainian troops remained in Iraq from 2003 to 2005, as the 5th Brigade was replaced by the 6th Separate Mechanized Brigade, the 7th Separate Mechanized Brigade and later by the 81st Task Force, which was the last Ukrainian unit in Iraq. It withdrew in December 2005 to US Camp Virginia in Kuwait, and was dissolved upon its airlift to Ukraine.

Iraq served as a training ground for a number of controversial figures in Ukraine’s recent history, including Viktor Muzhenko.

For example, the infamous pilot of the Ukrainian Air Force, Nadezhda Savchenko — who would be taken captive on July 19, 2014, under unclear circumstances — served on the 6th Separate Mechanized Brigade. According to available sources, she first enlisted and joined the 95th Zhitomir Airmobile Brigade, and served as a gunner for six months in 2004–2005 in the 3rd company of the 72nd Separate Mechanized Battalion. In 2009, she reminisced about everyday life in Iraq in an interview with a Ukrainian newspaper. For her, the war that brought untold suffering to millions of Iraqis was “the only place where a soldier could do what a soldier is meant to do, rather than sweep up cigarette butts or clean toilets”.

Dmitry Tymchuk was another adventurer who served in Iraq. The retired lieutenant colonel now heads Information Resistance, a Ukrainian group covering developments in the south-east of Ukraine. As a military reporter he visited Ukrainian forces in Iraq three times. Photos of Tymchuk in military gear can still be seen on his Facebook page, reminding the readers of Ukraine’s war in Iraq: desert camouflage, an exotic country, Wild West-type operations, and free Coke provided by Kellogg Brown & Root at the mess hall on Delta base.
GEORGIA’S CONSISTENT POLICY OF NATO INTEGRATION
Georgia: NATO capabilities, forces and assets in the country

Georgia, which began pursuing military integration with the West in the early 1990s, has been working hard to accelerate and deepen this process. To date, the scale and nature of Georgia’s cooperation with NATO within the partnership framework are practically the same as in the case of NATO member-countries, though without corresponding obligations on the part of Brussels.

**Political institutions**
- NATO-Georgia Commission
- NATO Liaison Office
- Information Center on NATO and EU
- NATO Trust Fund

**Research institutions**
- Atlantic Council of Georgia
- Road to NATO
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

**Civil society institutions**
- Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
- Civil Council on Defense and Security
- Open Society Georgia Foundation
- Levan Mikeladze Foundation
- Civil Society Institute
NATO bases in Georgia

1. US Naval Base at Poti
2. US Air Force Base at Kolkhi and Army Base at Senaki
3. Turkish Military Base at Akhalkalaki
4. US Air Force Base at Marneuli

Georgian military bases organized in compliance with NATO standards

1. Poti Naval Base
2. Senaki Military Base
3. Khoni Military Base
4. Kutaisi Military Base
5. Batumi Naval Base
6. Khelvachauri Military Base
7. Akhalkalaki Military Base
8. Gori Military Base
9. Bolnisi Air Force Base
10. Marneuli Air Force Base
11. Krtsanisi Military Base
12. Alekseyevka Air Force Base
13. Mukhrovani Military Base
14. Vaziani Military Base

Military exercises held jointly with NATO countries and partner states in Georgia

1. 2001
   Multinational combined naval exercise Cooperative Partner 2001, Poti

2. 2002
   Multinational field training exercise Cooperative Best Effort 2002, Tbilisi

3. 2003
   Multinational military medical exercise MedCare-Rescuer-03, Tbilisi

4. 2007
   Air exercise Cooperative Archer 2007, Vaziani Air Force Base

5. 2008
   Security cooperation exercise Immediate Response 2008, Vaziani

6. 2009
   Cooperative Longbow/Lancer 2009, Tbilisi, Vaziani

7. 2012
   International consequence management field exercise Georgia-2012, near Tbilisi

8. 2014
   International command post exercise Viking 2014, Vaziani Air Force Base, April 1-10

Other areas and formats of NATO-Georgia cooperation

- 2003: Georgia joins NATO Air Situation Data Exchange program
- 2004: Georgia is offered an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for NATO integration
- 2005: Georgia and NATO sign an agreement on the provision of host nation support and transit to NATO forces and NATO personnel to assist the ISAF operation in Afghanistan
- 2006: Georgia and NATO sign the Host Nation Support Memorandum of Understanding, under which NATO countries can deploy troops in Georgia
- 2008: Georgia develops the Annual National Program to adapt its military structure to NATO standards
- 2009: Individual Georgian battalions begin training to join ISAF forces in Afghanistan
A meeting of NATO representatives in Georgia
Georgia began working with NATO immediately upon gaining independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a NATO institution created to improve relations between NATO and non-NATO countries. Council members cooperate and consult on a number of political and security issues. The NACC was succeeded in 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In 1994, Georgia joined the Partnership for Peace, a NATO program aimed at fostering military cooperation with non-NATO states in Europe and with former Soviet republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. There are 22 partner countries. PfP is to intensify NATO-Georgia bilateral contacts. Like all other partner countries, Georgia has made certain political commitments, including to promote national defense planning and budgeting transparency as a means of imposing democratic control over the armed forces and to enhance its ability to contribute to NATO-led peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

The first multilateral cooperation document that Georgia signed with NATO was the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), an international agreement specifying the legal status of the military forces of a country (or military alliance) as

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deployed in the host country. These agreements stipulate the rights and privileges of foreign military personnel and jurisdictional issues related to said personnel and property. Apart from defining the legal status of foreign military forces that intend to participate in military exercises in a host country under the Partnership for Peace program, these agreements also provide legal protection to NATO military units deployed in partner countries.

The “partnership tools” include obligations to be assumed by the partner country. In 1996, Georgia participated in 20 NATO events, which subsequently rose to 70 events in 1997, 120 in 1998, and 140 in 1999.

In 1999, Georgia joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of Partnership for Peace, initiated in 1994. PARP is designed to achieve interoperability between partner militaries and NATO’s Allied Joint Force. Changes in Georgia’s foreign policy followed soon after. In particular, the country withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, thus finally opting for a pro-US foreign policy orientation.

President Eduard Shevardnadze officially declared Georgia’s intention to seek NATO membership at the NATO/EAPc summit in Prague in 2002, belying the notion that Georgia’s integration with the West is about joining the EU, which would at least make sense from the standpoint of the economic self-interests of the Georgian elite. But it was Mikheil Saakashvili, brought to power in 2003 by the Washington-backed coup (so-called “Rose Revolution”), who did the most to deepen integration with NATO. Georgia signed onto the NATO Air Situation Data Exchange program in 2003 and joined the system in March 2008. This program facilitates the mutual exchange of air traffic information between the Georgian command and control centre (CCC) in Tbilisi and the NATO control and Reporting Centre (CRC) in Erzurum, Turkey. NATO provides Georgia with information about the air situation in the South Caucasus in return for information from Georgian radar stations.

In 2004, Georgia began implementing its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for NATO integration. Two-year IPAP plans include a list of concrete political, economic and military reforms to be carried out by the partner state. The document sets forth the terms of allied relations and strategic military partnership. IPAP countries, which are generally eligible to apply for NATO membership, are considered NATO’s main partners outside the alliance and are afforded certain security guarantees.

In 2005, Georgia and NATO signed an agreement providing host nation support and transit to NATO forces and NATO personnel, allowing NATO and other ISAF nations to send military personnel and equipment, including weaponry, to Afghanistan via Georgian air, road and rail infrastructure.

In 2006, Georgia and NATO signed the Host Nation Support Memorandum of Understanding, under which NATO countries were allowed to deploy troops in Georgia.

Later in 2006, NATO foreign ministers invited Georgia to start an Intensified Dialogue on its membership aspirations at a NATO Council meeting in New York.

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York. The Intensified Dialogue — the next step on the path to membership — involves military reforms aimed at transitioning the aspiring member’s armed forces to NATO standards, as well as Georgia–NATO consultations on foreign policy (such as the conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgia’s involvement in NATO operations) and domestic policy issues (military education, military reform, etc.).

In 2008, NATO foreign ministers decided that Georgia should develop an Annual National Program (ANP)\(^{42}\). The ANP is almost identical to the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a NATO program of advice, assistance and practical support for government, defense and security agencies of aspiring members. In the case of Georgia, the ANP’s political section says how to “reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia, make steps towards democratization of social activity, and ensure civil control over armed forces”. Military measures include reorganization of military administration and operational planning along NATO standards, as well as the development of military infrastructure. The ANP also clearly sets out practical measures to restore the war-fighting capability of the Georgian armed forces, their technical equipment level and interoperability with NATO.

In September 2008, NATO and Georgia established the NATO–Georgia Commission (NGC) to accelerate the country’s integration into the alliance. The commission meets annually at the level of heads of state and defense and foreign ministers. The ultimate goal is to get Georgia to implement the political, economic and defense-related reforms necessary for NATO membership. Another goal is to coordinate alliance efforts to assist Georgia in recovering from the August 2008 conflict with Russia\(^ {43}\).

In 2008, NATO and Georgia launched a new mechanism, NATO–Georgia Military-to-Military Cooperation, which has resulted in a Military Cooperation Work Plan and an Implementation Program. Georgia also joined two other NATO programs, the Professional Development Program\(^ {44}\) and the Defence Educational Enhancement Program, which promote closer cooperation between NATO officials and the Georgian Defense Ministry, media and NGOs\(^ {45}\).

The Georgian Defense Ministry is in charge of overseeing adoption of NATO standards in the Georgian armed forces\(^ {46}\) through the ANP, bilateral cooperation with NATO countries and participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions. NATO’s Military Committee oversees defense cooperation projects with Georgia\(^ {47}\), while its working group is responsible for day-to-day coordination of joint projects. NATO’s International Military Staff\(^ {48}\) is responsible for planning, preparation and providing all-round assistance in Georgia–NATO military cooperation.

A focus of Georgia’s military reforms is the training of officers at NATO military institutes. Not only are Georgian officers trained for service in the armed forces, they are also evaluated as potential candidates to take over top military and civilian positions in the future in order to ensure the continuity of the country’s pro-Western policy.

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\(^{45}\) NATO–Georgia Professional Development Programme Launches Third Phase // Georgia Today. 01.08.2014. http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php?id=12550


\(^{47}\) NATO Military Committee //NATO Official Website. www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/topics_49633.htm

\(^{48}\) International Military Staff // NATO Official Website. www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/topics_64557.htm?selectedLocale=en
The end goal of NATO’s efforts to reform the Georgian army is to convert it to NATO standards by achieving interoperability and cultivating high- and middle-ranking officers so as to gain control over the country’s armed forces and to use them to its own ends. PfP includes the Science for Peace and Security Program, which funds 40 research projects in Georgia with goals ranging from improving transboundary waters and counter-terrorism to maritime safety and network technologies. In 2002, Georgia joined the Virtual Silk Highway Project, which involved installing a satellite-based network to provide Internet access to scientists and researchers in eight countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.

Georgia also has several national doctrines that set the goal of NATO membership.

On December 28, 2002, Georgia’s National Security Council adopted the State Program on Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration, which prescribed practical measures to be taken on a range of economic, political, military and other issues.

On May 23, 2003, President Shevernadze issued Executive Order No. 235, establishing the National Coordination Council for Euro-Atlantic Integration, which would later report directly to President Saakashvili. On December 31, 2003, the Georgian government passed a resolution creating an office for European and Euro-Atlantic integration under the deputy prime minister in charge of coordination and oversight of state policy on NATO membership.

On February 5, 2008, a majority of voters supported NATO membership in a referendum held at the same time as an early presidential election. The country’s establishment touted the referendum results as proof that the majority of Georgians support the government’s decision to pursue NATO membership.

The Georgian law On Defense Planning of April 28, 2006 states that “defense planning as part of the defense policy includes measures to support Georgia’s integration into the North Atlantic Treaty organization”.

The Georgian law On Defense Planning of April 28, 2006 states that “defense planning as part of the defense policy includes measures to support Georgia’s integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”.

The Georgian’s National Military Strategy has a section titled National Security Context, which states that “the occupation of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and represents a major source of destabilisation”. Supporters of NATO membership in Georgia cite the alleged threat posed by Russia as the main justification for their position. The document also identifies integration into NATO and the European Union as “one of the key priorities of [the] country’s foreign and security policy” and includes a requirement to improve “operational planning and training processes using tailored CAF [Georgian Armed Forces] doctrine compatible with NATO and Partner Nations”. The strategy states that deeper cooperation with NATO is in the interests of regional and international security and that Georgia will “continue its engagement” in the NATO-led post-2014 mission in Afghanistan, called Resolute Support.

The Minister’s Vision sets the defense priorities for the Georgia Defense Ministry for 2013-2014. Its stated goal is to “create highly capable, mobile, modern, fully professional armed forces that are fully interoperable with NATO”.

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49 Expansion of SILK-Afghanistan connects additional 9000 students to global information highway, NATO Official Website, October 25, 2011. www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/news_67108.htm?selectedLocale=en


It also reaffirms that **NATO integration remains a key priority for Georgian foreign and security policy.**

**Title II of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement** focuses on intensifying “political dialogue on all areas of mutual interest, including foreign and security matters as well as domestic reform”. The **aims of political dialogue are “to deepen political association and increase political and security policy convergence and effectiveness”.** Georgia and the EU also pledge “to strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Parties on international security and crisis management, notably in order to address global and regional challenges and key threats”. The parties also resolve “to intensify their dialogue and cooperation and promote gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy, including the Common Security and Defense Policy”.

Moreover, **Georgia is to continue to pursue the public administration reform and to adapt its legal system and police to meet EU standards.** This means that in applying these standards, the Georgian government will essentially be reporting to supranational agencies.

Under the agreement’s provisions on regional cooperation, Georgia is to cooperate with the EU in the interests of stability and political and economic cooperation in the region. The agreement indirectly supports Georgia’s claim to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stating that the EU would provide “all benefits of closer political association between Georgia and the EU including increased security policy convergence to all citizens of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders”. **This can be interpreted as a legal justification for intervening in the internal affairs of Abkhazia and South Ossetia**, something that may entail certain consequences for Russia in the North Caucasus. A similar challenge emerged at the start of the counterterrorism operation in Chechnya, when groups fighting Russia's federal forces in the North Caucasus used Georgian territory for their base of operations.

NATO's Strategic Concept (2010) proclaimed the alliance's intention to continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO–Georgia Commissions. Experience has shown this to be the most effective bilateral format in US-Georgia relations.

**Georgia launched military cooperation with the United States immediately after gaining independence in 1991, when the US started training Georgia’s special 51-man counterterrorism unit, Omega, providing $46 million in funding.** After losing the battle for Sukhum, the capital of Abkhazia, in 1993, Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Cooperation with the United States was put on hold.

Georgia-US military cooperation resumed in 1998 under the supervision of John Shalikashvili, a US Army general of Georgian and Polish descent, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Supreme Allied Commander from 1993 to 1997. During that period, Washington gave Georgia $93 million in aid to modernize its armed forces.
In 2002, the United States launched the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) to train and equip four Georgian army battalions for counterterrorism operations. Under the program, which lasted roughly two years, US instructors trained over 2,000 Georgian military personnel. Washington spent $64 million on the program, including construction of a training camp near Tbilisi.

During the first phase of the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP I) from March 2005 to July 2006, US military instructors trained another 2,000 Georgian troops. GSSOP I, a security assistance program designed to build up the capacity of the Georgian military, cost approximately $60 million.

The second phase of the program, GSSOP II, began on September 19, 2006, and lasted until June 2007. Funding for GSSOP II totaled $40 million and was used to train one infantry brigade.

On February 14, 2008, the US Senate approved a resolution expressing strong support for offering Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine.

After the end of the August 2008 five-day war between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia, the United States allocated $1 billion to Georgia for economic recovery. On January 20, 2009, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mary Beth Long said the United States would assist Georgia's military reform and modernization efforts.

On January 9, 2009, the United States and Georgia signed the Charter on Strategic Partnership, which is focused on defense and security cooperation. Essentially, the charter can be considered a treaty on mutual military and political assistance in which the US assumes the role of guarantor of Georgia's security. The charter led to the formation of the US–Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission, whose Security Working Group seeks to promote Georgia's efforts in defense reform, and improve its defense capabilities, including NATO interoperability. In the Charter, the United States and Georgia pledge “to increase interoperability and coordination of capabilities between NATO and Georgia”.

The United States and Georgia also cooperate under the DOS Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. It is estimated that in the past 15 years the United States has allocated $1.6 billion to Georgia, including in the form of military aid. The bulk of the funding — over $100 million annually — has come in the past three or four years. This is a huge sum considering that Georgia’s military budget was about $360 million in 2001 (although it nearly doubled in 2012 to over $600 million). In 2011, Georgia received $15.968 million under the FMF program, and a comparable amount ($14.4 million) was earmarked for 2012. As a participant in the US International Military Education and Training program, Georgia received assistance in organizing training courses, seminars and other events for military personnel.

The Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, introduced in the US Senate, would extend high-level security guarantees to Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, which would be “treated as though each were designated a major non-NATO ally (MNNA)”. Israel, for example, has MNNA status.
Private military companies have augmented the US presence in Georgia. For example, the firm Military Professional Resources, Inc. was hired to train Georgian military personnel “on the most up-to-date soldier tactical skills for the battlefield”\(^{67}\). Cubic instructed Georgian officers in leader development\(^{68}\), including at Krtsanisi Air Force Base in Georgia.\(^{69}\) L–3 Communications worked with the Georgian military under a contract with the US Department of Homeland Security.\(^{70}\) Booz Allen Hamilton has been awarded several defense procurement contracts by the Georgian government.\(^{71}\) General Dynamics carried out a training project at the Vaziani Military Base in Georgia.\(^{72}\)
II.
The Georgian army as NATO appendage

Over the last 20 years, Georgian leaders and NATO members have gone to great lengths to bring the country’s military in line with NATO standards. For instance, the GAF Combat Training and Military Education Command (CTMEC) is responsible for improving the military training system, as well as overseeing and coordinating military education. The army’s service personnel are educated in accordance with NATO standards.

CTMEC controls the following military education institutions:
- David Agmashenebeli National Defense Academy (Gori): training for junior officers and refresher training for different-level command personnel;
- NCO Training School (Gori): professional training and retraining for NCOs;
- Krtsanisi National Training Center (Krtsanisi): basic and specialized military training;
- Armor Training Center (Akhaltsikhe): training crews for mechanized and armored units;
- Mountain Training Center (Sachkhere): mountain military training, including for NATO members and Georgia’s partners;

In addition, Georgia hosts the following NATO military facilities:

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The Georgian army as NATO appendage

The Georgian army as NATO appendage

- Kolkhi US airbase in Senaki (Megrelia);
- US ground troops base in Senaki (Megrelia);
- US naval base in Poti (Megrelia);
- US airbase in Marneuli (Borchaly);
- Turkey’s military base in Akhalkalaki (Javakheti).

The Academy offers 4-year bachelor’s degree and 2-year master’s degree programs. The bachelor’s program is open to high school graduates under the age of 24. After passing the entrance tests, enrollees can choose from a number of majors and train for officer positions at infantry, tank, artillery, engineer, air force or antiaircraft units.

Some disciplines and courses are offered in foreign languages by US, British, German and Turkish military experts. Moreover, the US Armed Forces share their teaching methods and textbooks.

NCOs benefit from a 12-week training course at the NCO Training School in Gori. Since 2006, this institution has been working exclusively with specially selected enlistees who sign contracts for at least five years. Military experts from the US and Germany contribute organizational direction.

Tbilisi and Kutaisi are home to NATO’s English language centers, where British officers teach English to their Georgian colleagues. In the future, the best students could be sent to military education institutions in NATO member states for advanced studies, to serve as interns in armed forces of allied nations, and to take part in NATO exercises.

Reform plans are stipulated in the Minister’s Vision, which has already been mentioned. The medium-term priorities for reforming Georgia’s armed forces are outlined in the Strategic Defense Review. In accordance with the Strategic Defense Review and the Minister’s Vision 2013–2014, the South Caucasus command echelon must be reformed to meet NATO’s needs, which entails:

- Reorganizing the Joint Staff as the General Staff;
- Eliminating the Ground Troops Command;
- Establishing East and West Operational Commands;
- Creating a strategic planning division within the General Staff (J-5);
- Establishing a navy planning division within the General Staff;
- Establishing a military inspectorate for monitoring combat readiness of the country’s armed forces;
- Creating mechanisms for streamlining command and control in the Air Force and in the Air Defense Command.

The last point refers to the NATO-compatible air defense system to be built in Georgia. All these initiatives are rooted in the idea of making the Georgian army fully interoperable with NATO even without the country becoming a member of the Alliance.

Allies are actively involved in instilling NATO standards in their Georgian mentees. In fact, as many as 2,000 Georgian soldiers benefited from training as part of the American-sponsored Train and Equip Program in 2002-2004, which is fully compliant with NATO standards.
During the US-led Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP I), American army instructors trained another 2,000 Georgian soldiers (3 battalions) in line with NATO standards.

During the International Military Education and Training program, Georgia was among the countries that received assistance from the US in organizing training sessions, workshops and other educational events for the country’s officers.

In addition, every year dozens of Georgian soldiers and officers benefit from internships and training sessions held by NATO units in Georgia, as well as partner and member states.

On June 11–23, 2001, the Georgian coastal city of Poti hosted the large-scale naval and amphibious exercise Cooperative Partner 2001, involving about 4,300 service personnel, 29 naval vessels, and 15 military and cargo airplanes. Seven NATO members, including the US, Turkey and Italy, and six partner-states, including Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, participated in the exercise.

In 2004, a Georgian contingent was sent to Afghanistan for the first time to join NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with Georgia’s contribution to the multinational force in Iraq rising to 300 service personnel in 2004 and 850 in 2005.


About 1,650 Georgians and 1,000 Americans took part in the exercise, including:

- About 1,000 service personnel from the US;
- 300 troops from the 1st Battalion of the 121st Infantry Regiment of the 45th Brigade of Georgia’s National Guard;
- About 700 soldiers from the African Command of the 48th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion.
- About 600 Georgian service personnel from the 4th Infantry Brigade, and 10 troops each from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

In 2012, Georgia hosted an international military exercise in its mountains as part of the Partnership for Peace program, bringing together troops from Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Armenia, and other countries.

“Instructors from the Sachkhere Mountain Training Center (Western Georgia) instructed students in various types of skiing. Service personnel were trained in avalanche rescue, skied an obstacle course and built a snow shelter, the so-called ‘igloo,’” Georgia’s Defense Ministry said in a statement.

Given the extent of NATO’s involvement in combat training of the Georgian army, it is unsurprising that Georgia is actively engaged in the Alliance’s operations and wars across the world.

**Iraq was the first time Georgia fought in someone else’s war.** In 2003, right after the coalition’s invasion, Georgia embarked on a “peacekeeping mission” by sending 70 military medics and a combat engineer platoon to Iraq. Its advance team was stationed in Tikrit.

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76 Major NATO Exercise Successfully Held in Georgia // Jamestown Foundation. June 26, 2001. www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=23246&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=215&no_cache=1#.U_NRevl_tys
In 2004, Georgia’s “peacekeeping” contingent was expanded to 300 people, and reached 850 people in 2005. Two years later, in July 2007, the Georgian parliament approved the president’s request to send another 2,000 service personnel from the 3rd Infantry Brigade to Al Kut.

The Georgian contingent was tasked with protecting several checkpoints and defensive positions, as well as monitoring traffic on local roads. According to official statistics, during this period the Georgian force inspected 175,000 vehicles, checked 792,000 people and carried out 2,400 patrols.

That said, it should be noted that Georgian units were seldom seen participating in combat operations. During its four-year deployment in Iraq, the contingent lost only 5 soldiers, including one suicide and one accidental death, according to official statistics. The other three died in 2008 in two separate incidents.

US soldiers and officers who served in Iraq regularly praised the Georgian forces in on-the-record statements, claiming that they were almost as well trained as British soldiers, who are among the best in NATO.

However, feedback from Iraqi authorities cooperating with the US and local residents was extremely negative. They said that Georgian servicemen were rude and the majority had no command of English, let alone Arabic. People from Wasit Province reported numerous incidents of drivers being forced to pay bribes at checkpoints. Representatives of local authorities said that the Georgian military did nothing to improve security in the territories they controlled in 2007–2008, leaving the responsibility entirely to the newly formed Iraqi law enforcement bodies.

In January 2008, the 3rd Infantry Brigade was replaced by the 1st Infantry Brigade. Like the Ukrainian force, it was headquartered at Delta Base in Wasit Province. All in all, Georgia sent 1,500 soldiers to Delta Base, 350 to Clear Base, and kept another 150 in Baghdad.

As is common knowledge, the 1st Brigade was recalled to Georgia during the August 2008 war and was airlifted home by US planes.

Georgia also fought a foreign war in Afghanistan. In 2004, the Georgian contingent was sent to Afghanistan to join “the global war on terror”.

In November 2007, Georgian doctors began working with a peacekeeping mission in the city of Chaghcharan, Ghowr Province, within Lithuania’s Provincial Reconstruction Team. Simply put, it was part of the occupying force that was in charge of Afghan territory

In 2009–2012, the Georgian military was part of US and British units deployed in the Afghan province of Helmand, and also contributed to French and Turkish troops in other parts of the country. Officers of the Georgian force, especially those from the 3rd Infantry Brigade who had fought in Iraq, were often tasked with training local police and troops, and instructing civilians in modern agricultural practices.

For instance, in April 2010 Georgia’s 31st Infantry Battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade was deployed to Helmand Province and was charged with patrolling the
territory alongside US forces. In November of the same year, the battalion was replaced by the 32nd Infantry Battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade.

After 2008, following changes in military training in Georgia, the contingent was expanded to almost 1,000 people, and tactics were modified as well. In 2010, the Command of NATO’s Northwestern zone in Afghanistan assigned to Georgians a separate area of responsibility in Musa Qala (Helmand Province), where they would perform the same functions as the Georgian forces in Iraq: manning checkpoints and patrolling the territory. But Georgian military are known to have engaged once in a combat operation alongside the US Marines to locate and destroy a Taliban force.

Officially, US command gave high marks to Georgian officers from the 31st and 32nd infantry battalions serving in Helmand, praising them for their leadership qualities and readiness to engage in dangerous operations. In the territories under Georgian responsibility, the situation was relatively calm by standards of southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban is very active.

However, there is no reason to believe that the Georgian contingent had much to do with that. Even in Musa Qala, Georgians are working in close contact with other countries’ forces deployed in the vicinity of the Musa Qala Base.

As of today, Georgia does not intend to reduce its presence in Afghanistan. In 2012, units of the 2nd Infantry Brigade were deployed there. At the same time, Georgian military doctors and gunners are providing training and logistical support to Afghan troops. Prior to the 2012 elections, Georgia sought to influence Afghan politics by advertising to local officials the record of reforms implemented under President Mikheil Saakashvili. Meetings between representatives of Kabul and Tbilisi mayoral offices were organized to this end.

In January 2012, Georgia’s contingent in Afghanistan was reinforced by an infantry platoon of 50 troops. In May 2013, the unit was placed under American command. Prior to the 2012 elections, Georgia sought to influence Afghan politics by advertising to local officials the record of reforms implemented under President Mikheil Saakashvili. Meetings between representatives of Kabul and Tbilisi mayoral offices were organized to this end.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the US and Israel are now the most active participants in military and political cooperation with Georgia. The US commitment to Georgia is rooted in two important strategic objectives:

1. Surrounding Russia with NATO members.
2. Encircling and blockading Iran.

Israel is seeking access to facilities near Iran’s border in order to be able to conduct airstrikes against the Islamic Republic. It is also important to note that NATO actively works with Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The prospect of enhanced military cooperation among these countries, including arms transfers, is very alarming.77

**Turkey** is seeking to build up its political influence and gain a stronger foothold in the region in order to expand its political reach to Central Asia, consolidate its influence in Turkic-speaking and Muslim regions of Georgia (Kvemo Kartli and Adzharia), and take Armenia in a military vice.

Judging by the enhanced military and political cooperation and by official statements, Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan\(^78\), and possibly Israel\(^79\), could establish a regional **military and political alliance under the aegis of the US and NATO**. A regional alliance of **Russia, Iran and Armenia** could serve as a counterbalance.


Moldova's Two-Faced Neutrality
NATO capabilities, forces and assets in Moldova

In violation of the Constitution and against the will of the majority of its people, the Moldovan leadership is making every effort to integrate the country with NATO. The purpose of this process, as in the case of other post-Soviet states, is to artificially create and maintain a confrontational posture toward Russia.

**Political organizations**
- NATO Information and Documentation Center
- NATO Science for Peace and Security Program at the Moldovan Academy of Sciences

**Analytical organizations**
- RENAM Association (Research and Educational Networking Association of Moldova)
- Foreign Policy Association of Moldova

**Civil society organizations**
- Expert Group
- Institute for Public Policy

**Military exercises with NATO involvement in Moldova**

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Cooperative Longbow/Lancer 2006</td>
<td>September 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>NATO-Moldova Peace Shield 2010</td>
<td>August 16 – 27</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Codrii 2011 disaster response exercise</td>
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**Moldova’s participation in military exercises in other countries**

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<td></td>
<td>US Saber Guardian 2014</td>
<td>March 21 – April 4</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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**Moldova’s Constitution proclaims neutrality, but it is not observed in practice**

- The Mission of Moldova to NATO headed by the Ambassador of Moldova in Belgium was established in December 1997
- In 1997, Moldova joined a number of NATO affiliates, such as SEESTUDY, SEECHANGE, SEEASTAFF and SEEMAG
- NATO Information and Documentation Center opens
- Ongoing exchange of intelligence information between special services of Moldova and NATO
- Training and re-training of the Moldovan National Army specialists goes on at NATO military colleges
- Systematic, phased-in modernization and transition of the Moldovan army to NATO standards
- Moldova’s leadership plans to host a NATO military base at Bulboaca Training Center
- Bulboaca Center was modernized in 2012 with funds provided by the United States under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)

50 MOLDOVA’S TWO-FACED NEUTRALITY
NATO capabilities, forces and assets in Moldova

**NATO Base in Moldova**
US military base for training spec ops in Briceni

**Marculesti Military Base**
Airfield rebuilt to meet NATO needs

**NATO Information and Documentation Center**
Its goal is to promote Euro-Atlantic values and standards in Moldova

**Moldovan Army Base**
Bulkboa Training Center has been retrofitted as a NATO military base

**Cahul Military Base**
Airfield rebuilt to meet NATO needs

* — Приднестровская Молдавская Республика

NATO capabilities, forces and assets in Moldova
Former Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
I.
NATO on the banks of the Dniester

The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova affirms the country’s commitment to neutrality and prohibits membership in military alliances, including NATO. The Constitution states: “The Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality” and “The Republic of Moldova does not allow the deployment of armed forces of foreign states on its territory”. And yet, Moldova’s constitutional neutrality has been repeatedly violated by the Moldovan authorities:

- President Nicolae Timofti of the Republic of Moldova expressly stated in late April 2014 that he would have voted for Moldova’s accession to NATO; members of the ruling liberal parties argue that “everything will be okay, if Moldova joins NATO” (Ana Gutu, Liberal Reformist Party);
- In May 2014, Liberal and Liberal Reformist parties filed inquiries with the Constitutional Court regarding the possibility of Moldova joining NATO without violating the neutrality proclaimed in the Moldovan Constitution. The Liberal Democratic Party’s charter names NATO membership as one of its objectives;
- The ruling alliance in Moldova has ratified two agreements that openly question the neutral status of the republic, namely, an agreement
on participation in EU crisis management and a military treaty with Romania;

- **Moldova was invited for the first time to the NATO summit held in September 2014** in the UK, and, according to Moldovan Foreign Minister Natalia Gherman, the country counts on the solidarity of “NATO allies” to secure the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transnistria.

The Moldovan media and security forces also consistently violate Moldova’s constitutional neutrality, as evidenced by:

- joint military exercises of NATO troops and the National Army of Moldova, accompanied by propaganda campaigns and the efforts of national authorities to promote the idea that Moldova needs to join NATO;
- intelligence sharing with NATO, daily radar reconnaissance flights over Moldova by NATO aircraft, and the training and retraining of military specialists of the National Army of Moldova at NATO military academies;
- **voluntary accession of Moldova to NATO military organizations to further convergence with the alliance**;
- NATO financial, military and technical assistance for the Moldovan army, as well as its gradual rearmament and adoption of NATO standards.

Thus, the security forces and the Chisinau authorities are violating the fundamental law of the republic and the neutrality proclaimed in the Constitution.  

Moldova has always gravitated toward pro-Western unions, and joined GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in late 1998. In 1999, Uzbekistan joined GUAM during the Washington NATO summit, following which the group became known as GUUAM. After Uzbekistan left the group, it reverted to its original name.

In 2008, the Polish Foreign Ministry put forward a new regional integration project for post-Soviet republics called the Eastern Partnership, which became, in effect, the successor to GUAM after the latter failed militarily and politically during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of August 2008. The main “curator” in the West is Poland, which has influence in Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine; in the south, it’s Turkey, which has influence in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

Since early 2010, NATO and the European Union have sharply ramped up diplomatic activity in Moldova. In the past few years, Moldova has been visited by an unprecedented number of diplomatic delegations consisting of foreign ministers of Sweden, Poland and the United Kingdom (for the first time in the history of the Republic of Moldova), as well as senior political and military officials, such as Joseph Biden, Herman Van Rompuy, Catherine Ashton, Cecilia Malmström, Angela Merkel, José Manuel Barroso, PACE President Jean-Claude Mignon, Bronislaw Komorowski, Head of the Department for Cooperation and Regional Security of NATO International Military Staff Major General Carlos Branco, and others.

On January 23, 2013, during a meeting with Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat in Chisinau, European External Action Service Director for Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia Regional Cooperation and OSCE Countries Gunnar Wiegand said Moldova is positioned to become the first Eastern Partnership

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81 According to certain Moldovan politicians, this may result in Moldova losing Transnistria (see statement by former Speaker of Parliament and Democratic Party leader Marian Lupu).
nation to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. Deputy Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn, who arrived in Chisinau on the same day, said during a meeting with Moldovan President Timofti that “the Republic of Moldova is the only Eastern Partnership country that deserves an advanced dialogue with the EU”.

Asselborn recommended that Moldova take “small steps” toward achieving its European aspirations. In early April 2013, the Moldovan parliament ratified the agreement on Moldova’s participation in international military operations conducted by the European Union (the Communist Party in the parliament voted against ratification, arguing that Moldova, as a neutral state, should only allow its military to participate in operations conducted by the UN and OSCE).

The key lobbyists for Moldova’s integration and cooperation with the military and quasi-military structures of NATO and the EU are Poland (political integration via the Eastern Partnership) and Romania (military integration with the North Atlantic Alliance).

**Timeline of Moldova–NATO cooperation:**

**Stage 1: Fact-finding, 1991–1994**

In the first few months after taking office, Prime Minister Mircea Druc made several statements on the need to draw closer to Europe and NATO. However, during his tenure from May 1990 to May 1991, Moldova was still part of the Soviet Union, and so this goal had to be postponed.

Moldova began working with NATO within months of gaining independence. On December 20, 1991, Moldovan Foreign Minister Nicolae Tiu took part in a meeting of the recently created North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This was when the first consultations between the Republic of Moldova and NATO took place following the adoption of the country’s Declaration of Independence. Against the background of the Transnistrian conflict, Moldova–NATO cooperation has taken on a pronounced anti-Russian tone.

Moldova joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992. NATO–Moldova relations further expanded in 1994, when Chisinau joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. The program was created at the initiative of the US government following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, and was designed to prepare prospective NATO members to join the alliance and to strengthen relations with countries which may or may not become NATO members in the distant future.

On January 6, 1994, President Mircea Snegur said Moldova was ready to join the organization and that he was personally invested in making it happen.

On March 16, 1994, in Brussels, the Moldovan president and the Secretary General of NATO signed a Partnership for Peace Framework Document, making Moldova the 12th member of the program.

**Stage 2: Strengthening relations, 1994–1997**

In 1997, as part of its efforts to strengthen relations with NATO, the Republic of Moldova joined the PfP’s Planning and Review Process. NATO opened a mission in Moldova on December 16, 1997, to improve coordination of NATO activities.
The second stage was also characterized by stronger research and technical ties between Moldova and NATO as part of the Science for Peace and Security Program. Its purported goals include:

- combating terrorism,
- defending against external threats,
- expanding Moldova’s research contacts.

The program was entrusted to the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Moldova, which was able to build an appropriate information network by 1999 with the program’s help.

**Stage 3: Transition, 1997–2001**

These years marked the transition from occasional to permanent ties, which saw the beginning of Moldova’s accession to NATO-affiliated organizations. In May 1997, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was reorganized, for better efficiency, as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal.

In December 1997, Moldova solidified its relationship with NATO, when the Mission of the Republic of Moldova to NATO was established and headed by Ambassador of Moldova to Belgium. Since then, Moldova has joined a number of NATO affiliates, such as SEESTUDY, SEECHANGE, SEESTAFF and SEEMAG, to name a few.

NATO has also helped Moldova eliminate old stockpiles of pesticides and other harmful substances. In December 2013, Chief of the Main Staff of the National Army of Moldova Colonel Igor Gorgan announced that 1,791 munitions had been defused. “We started implementing a project for the destruction of expired munitions with poisonous substances in certain regions of the republic,” Gorgan said. “Its budget amounts to 2.2 million euros; the funds were provided by foreign donors; 1,270 metric tons of toxic chemicals will have been removed by May 2014”.

**Stage 4: Eliminating dangerous weapons, 2001–2006**

During the visit by the President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin to NATO Headquarters on June 28, 2001, the Memorandum of Understanding with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) on logistics cooperation was signed. In accordance with the memorandum, a special NATO-financed fund was established in 2002 to oversee the destruction of munitions, in particular, AP mines and rocket fuel.

On January 1, 2004, the Romanian Embassy took over the United States Embassy’s role as the NATO contact point for Moldova. The mandate of a NATO contact point is to support the NATO Public Diplomacy Division by running public awareness programs about the objectives and missions of the alliance, as well as programs related to NATO’s cooperation with other countries within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council held a summit in Istanbul on June 28–29, 2004, during which participants decided that assistance would be provided primarily to Council members, which implement Individual Partnership Action Plans against Terrorism and for Defence Institution Building.
On June 7, 2005, President Vladimir Voronin visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels, where he personally handed the Secretary General a letter requesting an Individual Partnership Action Plan for Moldova, which he promised Moldova would approve in the near future. In his remarks that day, President Voronin said that an immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Moldova would be a decisive step toward resolving the Transnistrian conflict.

On November 14–15, 2005, during the international conference “Neighboring NATO and EU: Policy Implications for Moldova’s Security and European Aspirations,” Romanian Ambassador to Moldova Filip Teodorescu said that Romania was committed to supporting and expanding political dialogue and practical cooperation between Moldova and NATO. According to the diplomat, this support will be handled by the Romanian Embassy. He also remarked on “the future of Moldova as a stable, democratic and prosperous country that has irreversibly joined Euro-Atlantic structures, in the interests of NATO and the country itself”.

Stage 5: Individual Partnership, 2006–2010

The government of the Republic of Moldova approved the first NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan on May 24, 2006, following the NATO Council vote on May 19. It provides for the following:

• expanded security cooperation with NATO and joint operations;
• Moldova’s integration with the European Union and other Euro-Atlantic structures, stopping short of membership, given the country’s neutral status;
• reforming the legal and electoral systems, central and regional administrations and parliamentary procedure in order to bring them into conformity with EU standards.

Under the plan, the Anti-Terrorist Center was established under the Moldovan intelligence agency, the Information and Security Service, in 2007–2008, in order to participate in NATO operations.

On October 19, 2006, speaking at the international seminar “Republic of Moldova and Euro-Atlantic Structures: Joint Efforts,” Chairman of the Moldovan Parliament Marian Lupu said, “The Republic of Moldova is committed to becoming an integral part of the NATO space,” and noted that the purpose of seminars and similar events was to gradually draw the republic closer to NATO “with the prospect of joining this Euro-Atlantic structure”.

The opening ceremony for the NATO Information and Documentation Center was held at the Moldovan State University in Chisinau on October 3, 2007, with the support of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. The declared goal: raising public awareness of the progress made on the Individual Partnership Action Plan.

Concurrently with the center’s opening, Chisinau hosted an international conference with a striking motto “NATO: An Alliance of Values and Solidarity”. Both events were part of the Action Plan and were attended by officials from the alliance, experts, diplomats and civil society members. In addition, awards
were presented to the winners of the contest “Relations between Moldova and NATO: Past, Present, Future,” held in Chisinau. The contest was open to young scientists, students and schoolchildren, as well as journalists working in national and regional media.

Stage 6: Updating the individual partnership, 2010–2013


The new IPAP involves forming Moldova’s 22nd battalion (including for the purposes of crisis settlement and peacekeeping), participating in NATO operations abroad (such as sending helicopters to Afghanistan), opening a military airport, and jointly combating terrorism. Under the plan, Moldova:

- **receives assistance from NATO in command and control, improving military structure of forces**, as well as improving border patrol and security techniques;
- participates in NATO activities to coordinate disaster relief and improve the legal framework in this area;
- **ends the use of the marching step that originated in the Soviet Army**.

In 2012, Moldova was accepted as a partner in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The initiative is funded by the US government through foreign aid programs in support of regional and international security.

Stage 7: Sharp increase in activity, 2013-present

The Moldova–NATO consultations held in Chisinau on March 26–28, 2013, revolved around the issues of modernizing the National Army, reforming the defense sector, and **regional security in the context of recent political changes**. Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, General Vitalie Stoian, noted at this NATO meeting the importance of Moldova’s participation in the Moldova–NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan for his country. He said, “The Moldovan armed forces need an adequate assessment by international experts who use the best practices in this area and have expertise in reforming defense departments”.

On December 2, 2013, **the ministers of defense of Moldova and Romania, Vitalie Marinuta and Mircea Dusa, signed an agreement on protecting classified military information** and a protocol on cooperation in military education, designed to speed up the process between Moldova and NATO.

On March 6, 2014, members of the parliamentary majority coalition once again **refused to consider Draft Law No. 1002, which would affirm Moldova’s abiding neutrality**, despite being duly introduced in parliament by the Communist Party back in April 2011. The draft law stipulates that Moldova:

- **prohibits the stationing of foreign armed forces on its territory**;
- **prohibits the use of its territory or its air space for military action directed against other countries**;
- commits as a neutral state not to engage in any form of military operations outside its territory;
• commits **not to participate in the military cooperation programs that introduce the defense standards of military-political alliances**.

On March 30, 2014, during a visit to Chisinau, Assistant US Secretary of State Victoria Nuland expressed her government’s support for Moldova, saying at a press conference following the visit that the United States was proud of the fact that Moldova joined the US in condemning what she called “the occupation of Crimea by Russia”. In April, Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO James Appathurai said that “**Moldova is the top priority**. It needs us, it asked for help and, in fact, it is about help for reforming and upgrading defensive structures so that they could defend on their own”.

On July 29, 2014, Foreign and European Integration Minister Natalia Gherman said in an interview with Radio Free Europe that Moldova was invited for the first time to attend a NATO summit, to be held in early September in Wales, and added: “We are nearing the NATO summit to be held in early September. We can expect that **our NATO allies will address the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova**. We shouldn’t forget that Moldova **contributed this year to the success of NATO’s missions to promote security and stability in Europe**. This is why we were invited for the first time to the NATO summit. I hope that we can count on the solidarity of NATO as never before”\(^82\).

Acting within the framework of Moldova’s cooperation with NATO and the EU on military, political and other matters, and against the will of a significant number of Moldovan citizens, the Moldovan authorities:

- declare their intention to leave post-Soviet integration associations;
- train their “peacekeepers” according to NATO standards;
- participate in international NATO “peacekeeping” missions.

“Peacekeepers” have been trained according to NATO standards for a long time now. In 2008, Latvia started training junior officers for the Moldovan army. In May 2012, an agreement on defense cooperation was signed by Moldova and Lithuania. In late February 2014, four experts from the German Antiaircraft Forces Command came to Moldova to advise the military command and Moldovan army specialists on providing adequate airspace safety and to offer an objective analysis of threats and risks. **The German specialists conducted special training for the Moldovan military in Chisinau on February 25–27, which was attended by officers from the Dimitrie Cantemir Missile Brigade, Decebal Air Base, and Air Defense Command.**

The National Army of Moldova’s Bulboaca Training Center provides training for up to 70,000 servicemen annually, including reservists and university
students. According to the press service of the Defense Ministry, Bulboaca offers training in 15 fields, including mine-laying and handling various types of weapons. The special contingent of the Moldovan armed forces that is part of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo trains at Bulboaca Training Center. In addition to Bulboaca, the military units have at their disposal four other smaller centers in northern, southern and central Moldova.

Since 2001, Bulboaca has been used by the National Army of Moldova to train intelligence units in counter-terrorism. According to the chairman of Transnistria’s State Security Committee Vladislav Finagin, the Moldovan authorities plan to host a NATO base at Bulboaca. He said Chisinau is “actively strengthening its military with the help of the United States and Romania” and plans to enshrine it in the new constitution 83.

The National Army trains at Bulboaca, including under NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, but, according to Vladislav Finagin, the center is being upgraded not only for the purposes of meeting NATO standards, which has become the guiding light of the Moldovan army, but for actual use by NATO. Finagin said that so far this work has been conducted secretly, but will eventually be backed up by the necessary legal framework. Over the past six months, Chisinau has been actively strengthening its military with the help of the United States and Romania: specialists from these countries are training spec ops forces for the Interior Ministry and the Information and Security Service of Moldova.

The Bulboaca Center was upgraded in 2012 with grant money provided by the United States under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). On October 2, 2012, Ambassador to Moldova William Moser said that the United States allocated $1.6 million under this program to improve the infrastructure of the Moldovan army 84. The upgrades were similar to those carried out at the Yavoriv Range in the Lvov Region, Ukraine, where Moldovan “peacekeepers” have been training since 2001.

The Moldovan military take part in a number of NATO “peacekeeping” missions. In December 2013, Defense Minister Vitalie Marinuta expressed confidence that the parliament’s decision to send a limited military contingent to Kosovo “is the culmination of the efforts of all servicemen” that shows that “the Republic of Moldova can fulfill its obligations to global security” 85.

However, the ambition of the Moldovan leadership to turn the country into a successful candidate for NATO membership is untenable. This study shows that Moldova is assigned an auxiliary role in the regional military-political scheme. NATO’s primary objective in drawing in the young Republic of Moldova is not modernizing its army or better training Moldovan servicemen. The purpose of this process is to use Moldova to artificially create and maintain a confrontational posture toward Russia, draw Russia’s foreign policy and military resources toward Moldova, and impede the successful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict.

In the near term, the future of the Moldovan armed forces appears bleak. In the post-Soviet era, the Moldovan military has borne all the features of a poor country’s army that is undergoing a phased-in “optimization” process in order to meet NATO needs for troops and other human resources.
Biographies of military and political leaders of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova

UKRAINE

Geletey, Valery
Minister of Defense of Ukraine

08.28.1967 Born in the village of Verkhny Kopropets, Mukachevo District, Trans-Carpathian Region
1985 Junior Supervisor, Military Unit 2142, Western Border District of the USSR State Security Committee (KGB)
03–04.1988 Squad Commander, Extradepartmental Security Service, Mukachevo, Trans-Carpathian Region
1990 CID operative, Mukachevo
1994 Operative, Internal Affairs Directorate, Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (DCOC), Main Directorate (MD), Ukrainian Interior Ministry (UIM) in Kiev
1996 Head, Minsk District Division for Combating Organized Crime, DCOC MD UIM in Kiev
1997 Deputy Head, DCOC MD UIM in Kiev
1998 First Deputy Head, DCOC MD UIM in Kiev
2000 Head, Oktyabrsky District Directorate, MD UIM in Kiev
2001 Head, CID Directorate, MD UIM in Kiev
2003 Head, Operational Service Directorate, MD UIM in Kiev
2004 First Deputy Head, Reconnaissance and Rescue Department, UIM
February–March 2005: First Deputy Head, MD UIM, and Head of DCOC
President Viktor Yushchenko appointed him Head of the State Protective Directorate (SPD) (identical to Russia’s Federal Protective Service)
Viktor Yushchenko promoted the new SPD chief to Major General. Two months later, he was promoted to Lieutenant General
Dismissed from his SPD post, presumably in connection with his close associate Viktor Baloga stepping down as head of the presidential Secretariat.
2011–2014 Vice President, Avant Bank
2014 Reappointed SPD head by Acting President Alexander Turchinov, replacing Sergei Kulik
The Verkhovna Rada approved Col. Gen. Valery Geletey’s nomination as Ukrainian Defense Minister

05.24.2007
06.2007
07.2009
07.03.2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pushnyakov, Anatoly</th>
<th>Commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine's Armed Forces, Lieutenant General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03.08.1954</td>
<td>Born in Kodym, Odessa Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Graduated from the Kharkov Armor Command School and the Malinovsky Armored Troops Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Graduated from the National Defense Academy of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.2003–07.2004</td>
<td>Served as a tank platoon and tank company commander with a motorized infantry regiment; chief of staff/deputy commander with a tank battalion. Later, served in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, 8th Army Corps, Ground Forces; Deputy Corps Commander; Chief of Staff/First Deputy Commander, Army Corps, Ground Forces. Also in 2005: Graduated from the Operational and Strategic Department, National Defense Academy of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.2010</td>
<td>Commander, 8th Army Corps, Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muzhenko, Viktor</th>
<th>Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.10.1961</td>
<td>Born in the village of Vystupovichi, Zhitomir Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Graduated from Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms School (currently, St. Petersburg Higher Combined-Arms Command School) and began his military service in the Trans-Caucasian Military District (ZVO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984–1986</td>
<td>Served as commander of a motorized infantry platoon and commander of a motorized infantry company at ZVO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–1992</td>
<td>Commander of a motorized infantry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1993</td>
<td>Officer, Senior Officer, Combat and Psychological Training Section, Tank Army, Cis-Carpathian Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1994</td>
<td>Senior Officer, Combat Training Section, Tank Army, Cis-Carpathian Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Graduated from Ukraine’s Armed Forces Academy. Appointed Chief of Staff/Deputy Regiment Commander, Tank Army, Cis-Carpathian Military District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Regiment Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, 8th Army Corps, Ground Forces; Deputy Corps Commander; Chief of Staff/First Deputy Commander, Army Corps, Ground Forces. Also in 2005: Graduated from the Operational and Strategic Department, National Defense Academy of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.2010</td>
<td>Commander, 8th Army Corps, Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 05.10.2012          | Appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by order of the Defense Minister |
| 08.24.2012          | Promoted to Lieutenant General by executive order of President Viktor Yanukovych. He was elected deputy of the Zhitomir Regional Council from the Party of Regions, but he left the party in February 2014 following the Euro-Maidan events |
| 05.20.2014          | Acting President Alexander Turchinov appointed him First Deputy Head of the Anti-Terrorist Center under the Security Service of Ukraine |
| 07.03.2014          | Appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by executive order of President Petro Poroshenko |
After graduating from the National Defense Academy, he held the position of chief of staff/first deputy corps commander of the Southern Operational Command 2002
Army Corps Commander 2004
First Deputy Commander of the Western Operational Command 07–12.2005
Commander of the Ukrainian Peacekeeping Contingent and Deputy Commander of the Center-South Multinational Division 2006–2008
Chief of Main Personnel Directorate/Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2009
First Deputy Commander, Ground Forces 2007–2009
Deputy Commander for Combat Training/Head of Combat Training Directorate, Ground Forces 09.2009
First Deputy Commander, Ground Forces 2014
Commander, Ground Forces. He was awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, 3rd Grade, and other decorations 2002–2004
First Deputy Minister for Combating Terrorism, Ministry of State Security 2004
Deputy Defense Minister 2004–2006
Chairman, “Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia” (a puppet entity controlled by the Georgian government) 2006–2008
Georgian Ambassador to the UN 2009
Founder of the Alliance for Georgia 2012
Co-founder of the Georgian Dream coalition

Kapanadze, Vakhtang
Chief of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, Major General

08.17.1960 Born
1978–1983 Attended Tbilisi State University
1983–1990 Worked at the Bagrationi Institute of Geography, Georgian Academy of Sciences
1990–1991 Deputy Defense Minister
1992 Commander of a reconnaissance battalion
1993–1999 Head, Combat Reconnaissance Division, General Staff
1999–2001 Commander, 11th Motorized Brigade, Georgian Armed Forces
2001–2002 Head, J–2 Department, General Staff
2002–2003 Attended the US Army War College, (Pennsylvania)
2003–2004 Commander, Ground Rapid Response Forces
2004–2005 Chief of the General Staff
2005–2006 Military Advisor to the President of Georgia
2006 Head, Analytical Service, Abkhazian government-in-exile (a puppet entity of the Georgian government)

GEORGIA

Alasaniya, Irakly
Defense Minister of Georgia

12.21.1973 Born
1995 Graduated from the International Law Department, Tbilisi State University
1994–1996 Attended the Georgian Security Academy
1998 Georgian Foreign Ministry
1998–2001 Georgian Embassy to the United States, Canada and Mexico
2001 Head, Security Service, Georgian National Security Council
Chachibaya, Vladimir  
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff

11.04.1971  Born
1989–1991  Served in the Soviet Air Force (Telavi, Georgia)
1995–1996  Reconnaissance Platoon Commander
1995  Completed a special reconnaissance course
1996–1998  Deputy Commander, Reconnaissance Company
1999  Infantry Basic Officer Leaders Course (Fort Benning, Georgia)
2002–2003  Completed courses for US officers and commanders
1998  Studied general and military English (University College of Ripon and York)
1999  Attended the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (Texas)
2002–2003  Personnel Officer, Special Forces Brigade
2004  Commander, GAF contingent in Iraq
2005  Commander, 3rd Infantry Brigade
2006  Chief of Staff, Ground Forces; Acting Commander, Ground Forces
2009  First Deputy Defense Minister
2010–2012  Senior advisor to the Georgian Embassy in the United States
2012  Deputy Defense Minister
11.2013  Completed NATO Defense College courses in Rome and Brusseles

MOLDOVA

Troyenko, Valery (Valeriu)  
Defense Minister

07.02.1957  Born
1982–1989  Inspector, Senior Inspector, Head of the Criminal Investigation Department, Comrat District
1990  Completed studies at the Omsk Higher Police School
1997–1998  Head, Main Law Enforcement Directorate, Interior Ministry
1998–1999  Dean, Stefan cel Mare Police Academy, Interior Ministry
1999–2001  Deputy Minister of Justice; Director, Correctional Facilities Department
2001–2003  Vice-Rector, Department Head, Criminological University of Chisinau
2003  Attended the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Lund, Sweden)
2007–2014  Director, Refugee Center, Migration Department
2014  Worked in the private sector

Fondos, Aurel  
Deputy Defense Minister

08.13.1965  Born
1983–1988  Attended the Riga Higher Service School
1998–1999  Attended the US Command and General Staff College
2003–2004  Attended the US Army War College
1997–2001  Division Head, Main Staff of the National Army
2001–2005  Deputy Directorate Head, Main Staff
2002  Staff Officer, SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina
2005–2007  Head, Strategic Planning Directorate, Main Staff of the National Army
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>Military Observer, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Chief of the National Army Main Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–2011</td>
<td>Commander, Moldovan Peacekeeping Contingent, Deputy Head of Main Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Speaks Russian, English, French and Georgian</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.2011</td>
<td>Member and Secretary of the Joint Control Commission of the Republic of Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.2014</td>
<td>Deputy Defense Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Speaks Russian and English</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gorgan, Igor**
Chief of the National Army Main Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08.02.1969</td>
<td>Born in Dubossary</td>
<td>09.23.1973</td>
<td>Born in the town of Michurin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–1992</td>
<td>Deputy Commander of an airborne company, regiment and division, Bolgrad, Ukraine</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Graduated from a service school in Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1995</td>
<td>Guards Company Commander, Stefan cel Mare Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Platoon Commander, Dacia Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1998</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, 2nd Battalion, Stefan cel Mare Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Company Commander, Dacia Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>Specialist, Mobilization Directorate, Main Staff, NA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Company Commander, Presidential Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2002</td>
<td>Attended the Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)</td>
<td>2001–2004</td>
<td>Deputy Battalion Commander, Presidential Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–2004</td>
<td>Deputy Commander, Stefan cel Mare Brigade</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Attended the Defense Language Institute (Texas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Staff Officer, Multinational Brigade North, SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Completed the Captains Career Course (Fort Benning, Georgia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–2005</td>
<td>OSCE Mission member, Georgia-Chechnya border</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Completed the Civil-Military Cooperation Course (CIMIC), Ankara, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>Deputy Commander, Moldova Brigade</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Staff Officer, Multinational Brigade, SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Senior Liaison Officer, Multi-National Force—Iraq</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Battalion Commander, Alexandria cel Bun Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>Deputy Chief for Combat Training, Main Staff, NA</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Instructor, UN Military Observers Course (Hammelburg, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–2010</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Completed a peacekeeping operations planning course, Monterey, California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006–2009</td>
<td>Completed the orientation course for NATO-PfP staff officers (Oberammer-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>gau, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion Commander, Rapid Trident 2006 exercise, Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Battalion Commander, Cooperative Longbow 2006 exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff Officer, Multi-National Force — Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander, 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2009–2010  Attended the Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)
2011  Completed a course on security, stability, transition period and post-war reconstruction at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany)

2010–2011  Commander, Moldova Brigade
2011  Commander, Stefan cel Mare Brigade
2012  Completed the Senior Military Staff Training Course at the Baltic Defense College (Tartu, Estonia)
2013  Commander, Ground Forces

Speaks Russian and English